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Is the International Court of Justice Biased?
Eric A. Posner and Miguel de Figueiredo1
December 13, 2004

Abstract. The International Court of Justice has jurisdiction over disputes between nations, and has
decided dozens of cases since it began operations in 1946. Its defenders argue that the ICJ decides
cases impartially and confers legitimacy on the international legal system. Its critics argue that the
members of the ICJ vote the interests of the states that appoint them. Prior empirical scholarship is
ambiguous. We test the charge of bias using statistical methods. We find strong evidence that (1)
judges favor the states that appoint them, and (2) judges favor states whose wealth level is close to
that of the judges’ own state; and weaker evidence that (3) judges favor states whose political
system is similar to that of the judges’ own state, and (4) (more weakly) judges favor states whose
culture (language and religion) is similar to that of the judges’ own state. We find weak or no
evidence that judges are influenced by regional and military alignments.

The International Court of Justice is the principal judicial organ of the United
Nations, and the only international court that has general subject matter jurisdiction over
disputes between all of the members of the United Nations, virtually every state in the
world.2
The ICJ has considerable importance, both political and scholarly. Many of the
ICJ’s judgments appear to have resolved real international disputes. And although in
many other cases states have failed to comply with its judgments, or to acknowledge its
jurisdiction, the ICJ remains a potent symbol of the possibilities of an international legal
system. For its defenders, the ICJ “plays the leading role in legitimating the [international
legal] system by resolving its disputes in a principled manner.”3 Critics of the ICJ—
mainly politicians and diplomats from states that have recently lost their cases—argue
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that the ICJ’s rulings are politically motivated.4 In the words of Jeane Kirkpatrick, the ICJ
is a “semi-legal, semi-juridical, semi-political body which nations sometimes accept and
sometimes don’t.”5
The ICJ is also of intrinsic scholarly interest for legal academics, even those who
do not study international law. It is, after all, a court, and resembles domestic courts in
the United States and other countries. A large literature debates judicial voting in
domestic courts, focusing on whether judges’ decisions reflect ideology or disinterested
application of the conventions of legal reasoning.6 The academic discussion has a parallel
in the dispute about whether the voting of ICJ judges reflects national interests or not. A
study of the voting patterns of ICJ judges might be of interest for those who study
domestic judicial decisionmaking.
This paper examines data on the voting patterns of ICJ judges. We test the claim
of the critics that the judges vote the interest of the state that appoints them rather than
enforcing international law in a disinterested way. The null hypothesis, then, is that
judges are “unbiased.” A judge votes in an unbiased way if he or she is influenced only
by the relevant legal considerations—such as the proper interpretation of a treaty—and
not by legally irrelevant considerations such as whether one party has a military alliance
with the judge’s state. The ideal way to determine whether a judge is unbiased, is just to
figure out the proper legal outcome of a dispute and then see whether his or her vote
matches that outcome, taking account legitimate differences in the legal cultures in which
judges are educated. The problem with this approach, however, is that the proper legal
outcome is rarely obvious, and, further, judges may make mistakes and vote the wrong
way even though they are unbiased.
To avoid this problem, we can look at voting patterns alone and see if they are
related to legally irrelevant factors. The null hypothesis implies that an unbiased judge
from state X is no more likely to vote for state X than is an unbiased judge from state Y.
The unbiased judge from state X is also no more likely to vote for state Z, where Z is an
ally of X, than an unbiased judge from state Y, where Z is an enemy of Y. We are thus
4
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not assuming that unbiased judges always vote the same way—as there can be legitimate,
legally relevant grounds for disagreeing on the outcome of a dispute—but only that their
disagreements are random (or correlated with relevant legal factors), and not correlated
with political factors.
The simplest way to test this claim is to examine whether judges vote in favor of
their home state when that state appears as a party. Previous studies have found some
support for this claim, but have also disputed the significance of this finding.7 We use
more sophisticated empirical tests, as well as more data, to show that, in fact, judges are
significantly biased in favor of their home state when that state appears as a party.
Whereas judges vote in favor of a party about 50 percent of the time when they have no
relationship with it, that figure rises to 85-90 percent when the party is the judge’s home
state.
This finding has limited importance, however, because it does not tell us anything
about the voting behavior of judges when their home state is not a party. It is possible that
only the judges whose home states are parties are biased, in which case their votes cancel
out, leaving 13 or so other judges to resolve the case impartially. We hypothesize that
even when a judge’s home state is not a party, his home state may have an interest in one
party prevailing, and that the judge’s vote will reflect his state’s interest. Previous studies
have found no evidence for this hypothesis. The most recent such study concluded:
[T]he record does not reveal significant [voting] alignments, either on a regional,
political, or economic basis. There is a high degree of consensus among the
judges on most decisions. The most that can be discerned is that some judges vote
more frequently together during certain periods than do others, and that in rare
instances, notably with the Soviet and Syrian judges, they have always voted the
same way. But there have not been persistent voting alignments which have
significantly affected the decisions of the Court. (Weiss 1987, 134)
However, this study and the earlier studies all have flaws; chiefly, the failure to rely on
statistical techniques that control for relevant factors.
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To test our hypothesis, we classify states into blocs—based on region, wealth,
culture, military and political alliances, and similar factors—so that we can determine
whether judges are biased in favor of state parties that belong to the same bloc as the
judges’ home state. We find substantial evidence for this hypothesis.
The paper proceeds as follows. Part I provides some background, including the
history of the ICJ and a brief discussion of the political and academic debates about the
ICJ. Part II provides our hypotheses. Part III describes the data and tests the hypotheses.
I. Background
The ICJ is not the first world court; it is the successor of the Permanent Court of
International Justice. The PCIJ began operations in 1922, and at its peak in the late 1920s
and early 1930s issued about two judgments on contentious cases per year. However, it
gradually lost relevance for governments beset by the problems created by the worldwide
depression and the rise of fascism. By the late 1930s the PCIJ, like the League of
Nations, had become irrelevant and it was not used at all during World War II.
The founders of the United Nations resurrected the PCIJ, albeit with a new name,
in the hope that a world court would operate more successfully if backed by the United
Nations, which was designed to be a stronger institution than the League of Nations and
enjoyed the participation and leadership of the United States.
The ICJ is based on the statute of the International Court of Justice, which is
independent of, but referenced by, the United Nations charter. All members of the United
Nations charter are parties to the statute, so virtually every state has been, from the ICJ’s
founding, subject to the jurisdiction of the ICJ. The statute of the ICJ is a vague
document, and has been supplemented over the years with other agreements, internal
court orders, and customs.
The ICJ has jurisdiction over three types of cases: (i) cases by “special
agreement,” where the parties to a dispute agree to submit their case to the court; (ii)
cases authorized by a treaty that provides that future disputes arising under the treaty will
be adjudicated by the ICJ; and (iii) cases between states that have declared themselves
subject to the “compulsory jurisdiction” of the court. Sixty-four states have accepted the
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compulsory jurisdiction of the court, albeit frequently with reservations, and numerous
multilateral treaties provide for ICJ adjudication.
Fifteen judges sit on the ICJ. Each judge has a nine year, renewable term. Their
terms are staggered, so that the composition of the court shifts by one third (not counting
retirements and deaths) every three years. No two judges may share a nationality. Judges
must have the standard qualifications, and typically they have significant experience as
lawyers, academics, diplomats, or domestic judges. Judges are nominated by states, and
then voted on by the security council and the general assembly. If a state appears before
the court as a party, and a national from that state is not currently a judge, the state may
appoint an ad hoc judge who serves only for that case but otherwise has the same powers
as the permanent judges.
If there are fifteen slots but 191 states (by the end of our period), how are the
states that receive representation determined? The slots are distributed by region,
currently as follows: Africa—3; Latin America—2; Asia—3; Western Europe and
“other” states (including Canada, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand)—5;
Eastern Europe (including Russia)—2. This distribution is the same as that of the security
council, and the permanent members of the security council have, by custom, one slot
each.8 Thus, the U.S., Russia, Britain, and France nearly always have a judge on the
court;9 other states rotate. Larger and wealthier states like Germany, Japan, and Canada
are more likely to have representation than smaller states. Many smaller states—Austria,
Bulgaria, Finland, and Turkey, for example—have never had representation. There have
been 90 judges so far. They have served an average term of about 9 years. In 79
proceedings, one or both of the parties used an ad hoc judge.
The history of the ICJ can be seen as a struggle between the internationalist
aspirations of the court’s supporters and the efforts of states to limit their international
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obligations. Consider the bases of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction by special agreement poses no
threat to states because they can avoid it simply by refusing to consent to jurisdiction.
The ICJ, in special agreement cases, serves as an elaborate arbitration device. To be sure,
unlike traditional arbitration, the state parties that use the ICJ do not select most of the
judges, so that the ICJ, unlike traditional arbitration panels, may be willing to decide
cases in a way that reflects the interests of states other than the two parties. But for just
this reason states may use traditional arbitration rather than the ICJ, if they wish.
Next we have treaty-based jurisdiction. Here, state consent is also needed—at the
time that the treaty is ratified—so in theory states have nothing to fear from treaty-based
jurisdiction. But in practice states sometimes must agree to ICJ resolution of treaty
disputes if they want any of the benefits of the treaty, and, as ICJ jurisdiction is always
reciprocal, states agree to ICJ jurisdiction so that they have the power to bring other states
to court. These states can then find themselves pulled before the ICJ against their will,
often many years after the treaty was ratified.
Finally, we have compulsory jurisdiction. Again, states can avoid compulsory
jurisdiction by not filing a declaration. But many states have filed this declaration,
apparently because they believe the benefit—being able to pull another state before the
ICJ—exceeds the costs—being pulled before the ICJ by another state. Note that the
obligation is strictly reciprocal: a state can be pulled before the ICJ only by another state
that has itself filed the declaration. In addition, most states have, through reservations,
consented to compulsory jurisdiction only for a narrow range of cases. The US’s
declaration, for example, excluded cases involving national security. When the ICJ
nonetheless found that this clause was satisfied in the Nicaragua case (discussed below),
the U.S. pulled out of compulsory jurisdiction. France also withdrew from compulsory
jurisdiction after the ICJ took a case without France’s consent in the early 1970s. No
permanent member of the security council remains subject to compulsory jurisdiction
except the UK.
One hundred and four cases have been filed with the ICJ; about a quarter of these
were dropped before the ICJ was able to make a substantive decision. In 76 cases, the ICJ
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judges voted on substantive questions.10 The most common type of case involved a
border dispute (31), followed by use of force (22), property (14), and aerial incident
(14).11 A few examples follow.
Corfu Channel (1947-1949). This case was the ICJ’s first contentious case. In
1946 British warships struck mines in Albanian waters and were damaged. The United
Kingdom filed an application with the ICJ, charging that Albania was responsible either
for laying the mines or for not clearing them. The ICJ held Albania violated international
law, and awarded Britain damages of ₤844,000. The Albanian government refused to pay
and a settlement was not reached until 1992.12

Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft and Crew of the United States of America
(1954). This case is the first between the two superpowers; it also disappeared because
the Soviet Union refused to participate. A few other cases in which the U.S. or other
western powers filed applications against the Soviet Union or its satellites also never
advanced beyond preliminary stages. The Soviet Union and its satellites have never filed
applications. For the most part, the ICJ was used during the cold war (and after) only by
western powers and developing countries.
The Temple of Preah Vihear (1962). The case was one of many border disputes
arising from decolonization. Cambodia filed an application against Thailand,
complaining that Thailand illegally occupied Cambodian territory around the Temple of
Preah Vihear. The ICJ ruled in favor of Cambodia. Thailand accepted the judgment and
relinquished its claim.
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South West Africa (1966). South Africa controlled neighboring territory (now
Namibia), claiming the right under a League of Nations Mandate. Ethiopia, Liberia, and
many other African countries objected to South Africa’s control and its policies, and,
after political efforts failed, filed an application with the ICJ. The ICJ took jurisdiction
over the application on a close vote, but then subsequently (after a change in the bench)
ruled that it did not have jurisdiction. The case is significant because the outcome
outraged the newly powerful bloc of former colonial countries, which resolved to boycott
the ICJ.13 The court repudiated its reasoning in a later case, an event likened to the U.S.
Supreme Court’s repudiation of the jurisprudence of Lochner.14
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (1979-1981). The U.S.
filed an application against Iran after the Iranian government permitted militants to seize
the American embassy and take members of the embassy staff hostage. The ICJ ruled in
favor of the U.S. but the ruling did not appear to have any influence on Iran, which
refused to participate in proceedings.
Nicaragua (1984). The U.S. had been supporting insurgents in Nicaragua, which
was controlled by the Soviet backed Sandinista government. The CIA mined Nicaraguan
ports and harbors in a secret operation; when Nicaragua found out, it filed an application
in the ICJ, claiming that the U.S. had violated various treaties as well as general
principles of international law. The U.S. argued that the ICJ did not have jurisdiction
because (i) the treaties did not confer jurisdiction on the ICJ, and (ii) compulsory
jurisdiction did not apply. When the ICJ held against the U.S., the U.S. refused to comply
with the ruling, and withdrew its consent to compulsory jurisdiction.
Breard (1998). Paraguay brought proceedings that challenged the United States’
failure to advise a Paraguayan national of his rights under the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations at the time of his arrest. The ICJ tried to stop the U.S. from executing
the Paraguayan national, but the U.S. refused to obey the ICJ’s order. The U.S. lost two
13
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subsequent cases (LaGrand (1999), brought by Germany; Avena (2004), brought by
Mexico) on similar facts, and in both those cases also refused to obey the ICJ’s orders.
Legality of Use of Force (1999). Yugoslavia filed ten applications against the ten
NATO states that participated in the military intervention in Kosovo. Two of these
applications were dismissed; the others are pending.
Figure 1 shows the size of the ICJ’s docket, by decade. The docket declined in the
1960s and 1970s and recovered somewhat in the late 1980s and 1990s. The reasons for
these changes are complex. In part, the number of states increased; but at the same time,
the court seems to have become less popular among the major western states.15

total # of cases filed/filings - moving average
0
5
10
15
20

Figure 1: Usage of ICJ: Filings
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As the number of UN members has tripled over this period, it seems clear that the
ICJ has become less popular, but it is not clear why.16
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II. Hypothesis
Scholars have proposed a range of motives for judges of domestic courts: they
may seek to maximize their wealth, their status, their leisure, attainment of their political
goals, or the probability of elevation or other future position. They also may seek
sincerely to rule in the manner dictated by law. Empirical studies so far have been
suggestive but inconclusive. Numerous studies find that judicial votes are correlated with
the ideology or party affiliation of the judge, but these studies are vulnerable to
methodological objections.17
The international setting adds a new factor: national identity. National identity
could affect decisionmaking in three ways: psychologically, economically, or via
selection effects.
Psychologically, if judges identify with their countries, they may find it difficult
to maintain impartiality. ICJ judges are not only nationals who would normally have
strong emotional ties with their country; they also have spent their careers in national
service as diplomats, legal advisors, administrators, and politicians.18 Even with the best
intentions, they may have trouble seeing the dispute from the perspective of any country
but that of their native land. National and linguistic differences may also interfere with
the establishment of collegiality on the court.
Economically, judges may be motivated by material incentives. Judges who defy
the will of their government by holding against it may be penalized. The government may
refuse to support them for reappointment, and also refuse to give them any other
desirable government position after the expiration of their term. These considerations are
likely to weigh even more heavily in the calculations of judges from authoritarian states,
as these judges do not necessarily have the option to take refuge in the private sector if
they displease their government.
The selection effect works as follows. Because governments choose the judges,
they can ensure that their judges are not too independent-minded by drawing from the
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pool of officials who have shown reliability and the appropriate attitudes. There is
evidence that the appointment of judges is a highly political process.19 States may try to
appoint judges who are already inclined to advance the national interest.
It is not the purpose of this paper to decide which of these explanations, if any, are
true.20 We are concerned with the question whether these factors or some other factors
cause judges to vote in favor of the interests of the state that appoints them.21 The
contrary view—the null hypothesis—is that judges take their legal role seriously because
they are ideologically committed to the development of international law, or think that
they are more likely to be rewarded for impartiality than for bias, or are not selected on
the basis of national bias.
The simplest hypothesis is that ICJ judges vote in favor of the country that
appointed them when that country is a party to the case. Thus, if the applicant is the U.S.,
and the judge is an American, then the judge will vote in favor of the applicant. If the
respondent is Nigeria, and the judge is an ad hoc appointee of Nigeria (whether he or she
is Nigerian or not), then the judge will vote in favor of the respondent.
This first hypothesis is simple and easily tested, but it does not resolve the main
question, which is whether the ICJ, as a court, is biased. For the normal two party case,
only two of the judges are nationals of the parties. We expect that their votes will cancel
each other out, and the question is, what about the other judges? Regarding these judges,
we hypothesize that they will vote in favor of the state party whose strategic interest is
more closely aligned with the strategic interest of the judge’s home state. We examine
several such alignments:
19
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The literature on domestic courts makes a distinction between naïve and sophisticated voting – where a
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own states. A stream of literature on the European Court of Justice (see Alter 1998, Gibson & Caldeira
1995) argues that judges of the ECJ vote impartially in order to strengthen the legitimacy of the court.
Unfortunately, ECJ votes are not public, so we cannot test this hypothesis using the method advanced in
this paper.
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1. Region. UN General Assembly voting often divides along regional lines, and
the ICJ has region-based representation. Accordingly, we predict regional alignments.
We will focus on continental alignments (North America, South America, Africa,
Europe, Asia).22
2. Military. We predict that NATO states and states within the Soviet sphere of
influence voted as blocs during the cold war (before 1989).
3. Wealth. Wealthier and poorer countries often form blocs in international
conflicts, for example, over trade. Thus, we predict that judges from wealthier countries
will favor wealthier parties, and that judges from poor countries will favor poorer parties.
States may also support members of trade alliances or organizations such as the EU and
the OECD.
4. Democracy. Many scholars argue that democracies share interests, and are
more likely to cooperate in international relations.23 We thus test the hypothesis that
judges from democracies are more likely to favor democracies; we also look at whether
judges from nondemocracies are more likely to favor nondemocracies.
5. Culture. Judges might be biased in favor of states for which they have a cultural
affinity. As proxies for culture, we use majority language and religion: judges are more
likely to vote for states with the same language and religion as the judge’s home state.
Note that these variables might, in fact, be better proxies for political alignments,
especially postcolonial alignments.
6. UN organization. We look at whether judges from states that are permanent
members of the security council are more likely to vote for permanent members of the
security council.

22

The regional representation on the ICJ is not quite the same, but alternative coding does not produce
results that are appreciably different.
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For examples, see Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999); Lipson (2003); Lake (1992); and Schweller (1992).
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III. Data
A. Approach
The case reports include a majority opinion, plus concurring and dissenting
opinions when they exist. The reports also show a vote tally for each issue that is decided.
Earlier reports showed only the vote tally, and not the identities of the judges who voted
each way, but one can usually (though not always) determine each judge’s vote on each
issue by reading all the opinions. Later reports give the vote tally and also reveal the way
each judge voted. Thus, one can determine how every judge votes on nearly every issue
in every case.
As a result, we can test our hypotheses in two ways. The case-by-case test asks
whether a judge voted in favor of an applicant or respondent in a particular case.24 The
issue-by-issue test asks whether a judge voted in favor of an applicant or a respondent for
a particular issue. We used both approaches, but only report our analysis and results for
the case-by-case approach.25
Let Vcj = 1 if the vote (V) by a particular judge (j) from a particular state is in
favor of the applicant in a particular case (c); otherwise Vcj = 0. The regression equation
is:
Vcj = β1 + β2i[applicant-judge nationality match] + β3i[respondent-judge
nationality match] + β4i[applicant-judge region match] + β5i[respondent-judge region
match] + β6i[region interaction term (β4i x β5i)] + β7i[applicant-judge NATO match] +
β8i[respondent-judge NATO match] + β9i[NATO interaction term (β7i x β8i)] +
β10i[democracy measure] + β11i[wealth measure] + β12i[applicant-judge language match]
+ β13i[respondent-judge language match] + β14i[language interaction term (β12i x β13i)]

24

Note that the special agreement cases do not technically involve an applicant and respondent, because
they are brought jointly by the two parties. In these cases, the words “applicant” and “respondent” are just
placeholders and should be read as “one party or the other.” Nothing in the analysis turns on the identity of
a party as an applicant rather than as a respondent.
25
The results are similar. The advantage of the issue-by-issue approach is that there are more data. A single
case may have as many as 10 issues, and the judges may vote differently by issue. The problem with the
issue-by-issue approach is that it counts each issue equally. But a judge who votes in favor of the applicant
on nine jurisdictional issues, and in favor of the respondent on one jurisdictional issue, is, as a practical
matter, voting against the applicant. It is not clear that such a judge should be considered predominantly
pro-applicant, or more so than in a case where he votes in favor of the applicant on the first of two issues
and the respondent on the second.
14

β15i[applicant-judge religion match] + β16i[respondent-judge religion match] +
β17i[religion interaction term (β15i x β16i)] + ui
The first variable—applicant-judge nationality match—is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the applicant state and the judge’s state are the same; otherwise the variable
equals zero. Respondent-judge nationality match equals 1 if the respondent state and the
judge’s state are the same. For example, if the case is U.S. v. Iran, then for the
observation containing the U.S. judge, applicant match equals 1 and respondent match
equals 0. For the observation containing the Iranian judge, the reverse is true. For the
observations containing other judges, both variables equal 0.
Next, we look at bloc voting. NATO applicant match equals 1 if the applicant is a
NATO country and the judge comes from a NATO country. The variable equals 0 if the
applicant is not a NATO country, or it is and the judge does not come from a NATO
country. Similarly, NATO respondent match equals 1 if the respondent is a NATO
country and the judge comes from a NATO country. The variable equals 0 if the
respondent is not a NATO country, or it is and the judge does not come from a NATO
country. We use a separate interaction variable to capture cases where the applicant, the
respondent, and the judge are from NATO, in which case we predict no bias. Note that
when a NATO country is an applicant, its own judge is a nationality applicant match as
well as a NATO match. The national applicant match variable serves as a control in cases
such as this.
These principles guide our tests of the other alliances and regional groups,
including region, the OECD, EU, and Warsaw Pact;26 and also of language and religion.
The language and religion match variables equal 1 if the applicant (or respondent) has the
same majority language or religion as the judge’s home state; 0 otherwise.
In the case of democracy and wealth, we can use a single variable for each. The
formula for the democracy measure is: |(judge’s state’s democracy score—respondent’s
democracy score)| - |(judge’s state’s democracy score—applicant’s democracy score)|,
where the democracy score ranges from 0 (authoritarian) to 10 (democracy).27 The
26

We eventually decided not to include these variables in the reported regressions because of
multicollinearity problems; but we provide some data related to them below.
27
We also test the democracy level in a dichotomous fashion, following the international relations
literature.
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formula for the wealth measure is: |(judge’s state’s logged per capita GDP—respondent’s
logged per capita GDP)| - |(judge’s state’s logged per capita GDP—applicant’s state’s
logged per capita GDP)|. In each case, the variable takes a positive value when the
judge’s state and the applicant state are similar along the relevant dimension, and the
respondent state’s is different. The variable takes a negative value when the judge’s state
and the applicant are different, and the judge’s state is closer to the respondent.
Finally, we use some controls, including controls for type of case (border dispute,
use of force, and so forth), type of jurisdiction, the existence of multiple applicants or
respondents, the existence of interveners, and so forth.28 Most important, we use fixed
effects for cases and judges, in order to ensure that case-specific and judge-specific
factors do not bias the results.29 Suppose, for example, that bloc voting occurs only in
hard cases or cases with certain attributes such as geopolitical salience, and does not
occur in other cases. If we don’t control for case-specific effects, our results will be
inflated. A similar point can be made about judge-specific factors.
Before we turn to the data, we should discuss selection effects. We already
mentioned one kind of selection effect: governments might appoint judges who are
impartial—in the sense that they vote according to legal principles—but happen to hold
an idiosyncratic view of the world that favors the legal principles that will end up helping
the appointing state in any ICJ litigation. On this view, the ICJ may be biased as an
institution even though the individual judges are unbiased. Because we are interested in
the institution as a whole, and less interested in the motivations of the judges, this
selection effect does not undermine our empirical analysis. We do note, however, that it
is unlikely that jurisprudence could be so elastic that a judge could always vote in good
faith in favor of his own country.
A more troublesome possible selection effect could occur at the filing stage rather
than the appointment stage. Suppose that states file cases with the ICJ only when they
predict that the judges will favor them. As a result, the pool of observations does not
contain those cases where (say) a judge votes against his home state, and our regression
results will exaggerate the extent of the bias. However, we do not think that this is a
28

We do not report regressions using these controls either because they make no difference or because they
eliminate too many degrees of freedom.
29
Greene (1993, 466-469).
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serious problem. Respondents do not have any control over whether they will be pulled
into court, so there ought to be no selection bias with respect to judges whose home states
are respondents. Yet judges who are nationals of respondents vote in favor of respondents
at roughly the same rate that judges who are nationals of applicants vote in favor of their
home state.30
A final type of selection bias is related to the type of cases that the ICJ is hearing.
Suppose that states tend to settle easy cases and litigate hard cases, with the result that
only hard cases make it into our data set. It is possible that the ICJ judges would resolve
the easy cases in an impartial way (and thus the cases are settled against the expectation
of impartial adjudication), and their biases affect results only when the proper legal
outcome is ambiguous. If so, then our results may exaggerate the overall bias of the ICJ.
This problem is more troubling than the others. To address it properly, we would
need to have data about the entire universe of cases where the possibility of litigation in
the ICJ existed. This is clearly impossible, and thus our results demonstrate only bias in
the cases that actually reach judgment. We should note, however, that it seems unlikely
that governments would believe that the ICJ would resolve easy cases impartially if it
doesn’t appear to resolve hard cases impartially. If governments observe that hard cases
are being resolved in a biased fashion, then one would expect that some government
would find it in its interest to try bringing a somewhat easier case to the ICJ when it
expects that the ICJ judges would be heavily biased in the government’s favor, as would
sometimes be the case. If the ICJ resolves cases like these impartially, then this would be
reflected in our results; if not, then there is no reason to doubt our results.
B. Description of Data
1. Who Litigates?
Although ICJ judges come from all regions, litigants do not. The main litigants
have been the United States (21 cases), Britain (15), France (11), German (7), Belgium
(5), Iran (5), India (4), Spain (4), Australia (4), and the Netherlands (4). Two thirds of

30

We do find that for some variables (language, religion), the coefficients and level of statistical
significance are higher for applicant matches than for respondent matches, suggesting that this selection
effect may exist to some extent.
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states have never appeared before the ICJ, including China, Japan, Russia/USSR, South
Korea, Brazil, Argentina, and Poland. During the Cold War, no Soviet satellite appeared
before the ICJ. And, until recently, most cases have pitted Western nations against each
other, or else developing countries against each other. Thus, it is immediately clear that
we are unlikely to have enough variation to test our hypothesis that general regional and
military alignments predict voting patterns.
2. Party Judges
By “party judges,” we mean (1) judges who are nationals of one of the state
parties; and (2) ad hoc judges appointed by one of the state parties because it does not
have a national already on the court. Several earlier studies investigate whether party
judges are biased. Most of these studies have concluded that they are somewhat but not
very biased, based on an issue by issue comparison of their votes to the votes of nonparty
judges.31 Table 1 provides our data.
Table 1: Votes of Party and Nonparty Judges in Proceedings
Judge
Party—National
Party—Ad Hoc
Party—Total
Nonparty

Vote in Favor of Applicant
Ratio
Percentage
15/18
83.3
57/63
90.5
72/81
88.9
656/1356
48.4

Vote in Favor of Respondent
Ratio
Percentage
34/38
89.5
37/41
90.2
71/79
89.9
638/1358
47.032

Judges favor their home state. They vote for non-home parties 47 to 48 percent of the
time; they vote for home states about 90 percent of the time.
There is thus substantial evidence that party judges vote in favor of their home
state. However, the votes of party judges may cancel each other out, and it is possible that
the nonparty judges are unbiased, and therefore the ICJ as a whole renders impartial
decisions.

31

See Weiss (1987).
Percentages do not add up to 100 either because of decisions that do not clearly favor the applicant or
respondent, missing data, or multiple litigants in a case.

32
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3. Nonparty Judges
We attempt to measure the biases of nonparty judges by looking for links between
their state and the state parties. We hypothesize that nonparty judges are more likely to
vote in favor of states that belong to a geopolitical bloc shared by their own state. Table 2
reports results for voting by bloc or alignment.
Table 2: Bloc Voting When Judge’s State Is Not a Party
Judge-Applicant
Match
0.38
86
0.52
44
0.43
28
0.60
10
0.54
31
0.75
76
0.66
149

Region
NATO
EU
OECD
Security council
Language
Religion
No match
All observations

JudgeRespondent
Match
0.38
66
0.36
139
0.23
48
0.28
148
0.57
79
0.41
103
0.37
147

t Test of
Difference
0.06
1.93
1.84
2.18
0.20
4.81
5.07

0.54
699
0.50
1194

Note: cells provide percentage of votes for applicant by a judge from a state that matches the applicant
or respondent along the relevant dimension, and number of observations. We exclude cases where the
applicant and the respondent share the characteristic in question (except in the last row), and cases where
the judge’s home state is a party (or the judge is an ad hoc).

The table provides support for the hypothesis of bloc voting. When the judge’s
state and one party match—both are members of NATO, EU, OECD, or they share
language or religion—and the other party does not, the judge is more likely to vote for
the matching state that the nonmatching state. For example, judges vote for the applicant
60 percent of the time when the judge’s state and the applicant are members of OECD
(and the respondent is not), and judges vote for the applicant 28 percent of the time when
the judge’s state and the respondent are members of the OECD (and the applicant is not).
These results are especially strong for language and religion. Regional alignments and
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security council membership seem to be irrelevant, however. The last two rows provide a
basis for comparison. They show that for observations in which the judge does not match
with either state along any of these dimensions, and for all observations (except when the
judge’s home state is a party), the percentage of votes for the applicant is around 50, as
one would expect. It is odd that the percentage of votes for the applicant when the
applicant and the judge both belong to the EU is less than 50 percent, but this may be
attributable to factors not controlled for.
Figure 2 shows the relationship between wealth alignment and the probability of a
judge favoring the applicant.33 The y-axis shows the probability of voting for the
applicant. The x-axis shows the extent of the match between the wealth of the judge’s
state and the wealth of the applicant: 5 means that the judge’s state and the applicant have
high GDPs while the respondent has a low GDP, or that the judge’s state and the
applicant have low GDPs while the respondent has a high GDP. Lower numbers mean
that the judge’s state’s GDP is closer to the respondent’s (whether high or low) and
farther from the applicant’s. In short, higher values mean that the judge’s state is closer to
the applicant’s; lower values mean that the judge’s state is closer to the respondent’s. The
observations are divided evenly among each value on the x-axis (about 120 per value).

33

We used purchasing power parity-adjusted GDP figures; see Heston et al. (2002); available at:
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php.
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Figure 2: Relationship Between Judges’ Votes and Matching Economies
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Figure 2 shows the predicted relationship. A judge is more likely to vote in favor of
wealthy states (per capita GDP) when the judge’s state is wealthy, than when the judge’s
state is poor. A judge is more likely to vote in favor of a poor state when the judge’s state
is poor, than when the judge’s state is wealthy.
Figure 3 shows a similar relationship between regime type and the likelihood of a
judge favoring the applicant. A low value on the x-axis means that the democracy score
for the judge’s state (whether high or low) is close to the democracy score of the
respondent.34 Again, the observations are divided evenly among values (about 182 per
value). A high value means that the democracy score for the judge’s state is close to the
democracy score of the applicant.

34

We use data from Polity IV.
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Figure 3: Judges’ Votes and Matching Political Systems
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The figure shows the predicted relationship. Judges from democratic states favor
democracies over nondemocracies, and judges from nondemocratic states favor
nondemocracies over democracies.
C. Results
So far we have limited ourselves to the raw data. The raw data are suggestive but
of limited value. In this section, we report the results of several regressions. The main
obstacle for our regressions is multicollinearity: wealth, democracy, language, religion,
and the various regional groupings are all, to some extent, related—in some cases, with
correlations as high as 0.5. 35 To address this problem, we run several regressions with
different groups of independent variables.
35

Another problem is that we run probit regressions and almost all of our independent variables are
categorical variables. This creates statistical problems that we acknowledge but have no remedy for. We do
note that one of our independent variables – the wealth measure – is continuous and significant in most of
the regressions.
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We use a series of probit models with and without fixed effects.36 Tables 3 and 4
report two sets of these regressions. Table 3 contains the results of regressions without
fixed effects; Table 4 contains the results of regressions with judge and case fixed effects.
The tables contain the standardized coefficients (the marginal probability calculated at
the mean), the standard errors (in parenthesis), and the value of the z-statistic for each of
the variables. The dependent variable is 1 if the judge votes in favor of granting the
applicant relief. Typically, this means that the judge joined the majority or filed a
concurrence. We do not report the results of regressions with judge fixed effects only and
with case fixed effects only. These results are largely consistent with the reported
results.37

36

For examples of papers that have relied on variations of this model or that justify its use, see Hausman
and Wise (1978); Beck et al. (1998); Laisney and Lechter (2002). Wooldridge (2002) suggests that the
fixed effects probit model has attractive features, but that its main practical drawbacks include obtaining
maximum likelihood for more than about five alternatives and the difficulty in obtaining partial effects on
the response probabilities, which involve complex calculation. Chamberlain suggests that a probit with
two-way fixed effects can present a number of statistical irregularities. To address these concerns, we test
our data with conditional logit models, and find that the results do not have any substantive impact. These
results are available from the authors.
37
We also run a series of regressions at the issue level. We find that the results are similar to those
presented here. And we reran our regressions holding the sample constant and find consistent results.
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Table 3: Probit Estimates with No Fixed Effects

applicant
respondent
app-region
resp-region
inter-region

(1)
pwin
0.40
(6.40)***
-0.42
(6.63)***

(2)
pwin
0.43
(7.03)***
-0.40
(5.88)***
-0.17
(3.15)***
-0.10
(2.19)**
0.22
(3.10)***

(3)
pwin
0.38
(5.98)***
-0.40
(5.93)***

(4)
pwin
0.38
(5.07)***
-0.35
(4.77)***

(5)
pwin
0.40
(6.30)***
-0.39
(5.85)***

app-religion

(6)
pwin
0.31
(4.20)***
-0.40
(5.76)***

0.15
(3.43)***
-0.13
(2.98)***
-0.04
(0.55)

resp-religion
inter-religion
app-language

0.24
(4.48)***
-0.06
(1.35)
-0.11
(1.03)

resp-language
inter-language
app-nato

-0.03
(0.42)
-0.16
(3.72)***
0.11
(1.16)

resp-nato
inter-nato
democracy
ln per capita gdp
missing gdp data

(7)
pwin
0.34
(4.80)***
-0.37
(5.11)***

0.02
(5.95)***
0.11
(4.12)***
0.00
(0.07)
1437
0.07

Observations
1437
1090
1437
Pseudo R-squared
0.06
0.09
0.06
Robust z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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1437
0.06

1437
0.07

1437
0.07

(8)
pwin
0.27
(2.88)***
-0.27
(2.94)***
-0.12
(1.89)*
-0.16
(2.56)**
0.22
(2.52)**
0.11
(2.22)**
0.02
(0.35)
-0.15
(1.71)*
0.27
(4.13)***
-0.01
(0.15)
-0.09
(0.64)
-0.13
(1.56)
-0.07
(1.16)
0.10
(0.86)
0.01
(3.55)***
0.08
(2.72)***
-0.01
(0.29)
1090
0.12

Table 4: Probit Estimates with Judge-Case Fixed Effects

applicant
respondent
app-region
resp-region
inter-region

(1)
pwin
0.52
(4.67)***
-0.55
(4.22)***

(2)
pwin
0.52
(4.68)***
-0.55
(4.19)***
-0.12
(1.15)
-0.10
(1.21)
0.24
(1.67)*

(3)
pwin
0.52
(4.47)***
-0.55
(3.87)***

(4)
pwin
0.57
(3.73)***
-0.48
(3.91)***

(5)
pwin
0.52
(4.60)***
-0.55
(3.94)***

(6)
pwin
0.51
(3.46)***
-0.56
(3.89)***

app-religion

0.33
(4.40)***
-0.16
(2.40)**
-0.11
(0.84)

resp-religion
inter-religion
app-language

0.39
(3.93)***
-0.10
(1.04)
-0.45
(2.65)***

resp-language
inter-language
app-nato

-0.14
(1.08)
-0.18
(1.70)*
0.13
(0.72)

resp-nato
inter-nato
democracy
ln per capita gdp
missing gdp data

(7)
pwin
0.50
(3.44)***
-0.55
(3.93)***

0.02
(3.22)***
0.13
(2.86)***
0.07
(0.59)
1157
0.48

Observations
1157
1157
836
Pseudo R-squared
0.48
0.48
0.46
Robust z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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1157
0.48

1157
0.49

1157
0.49

(8)
pwin
0.40
(1.65)*
-0.45
(2.57)**
-0.12
(0.83)
-0.18
(1.62)
0.35
(1.90)*
0.27
(2.67)***
-0.02
(0.21)
-0.20
(1.21)
0.49
(3.93)***
-0.12
(1.09)
-0.38
(1.44)
-0.32
(2.23)**
-0.09
(0.65)
0.35
(1.77)*
0.01
(1.72)*
0.11
(1.99)**
0.02
(0.09)
836
0.49

The first two rows in both tables show the results for the applicant-judge match
and respondent-judge match variables. The coefficients are consistent with our
hypothesis, and highly significant across almost all of the regressions.
The results for wealth are as predicted and significant, and robust against
alternative specifications.38 The results for democracy are also as predicted and
significant at the 99% level of confidence when tested alone with the judge-party
matches; democracy maintains its statistical significance, and is positively signed in
accordance with our hypothesis when controls are introduced into the regression.39
The results for religion and language are more mixed but still strong. When a
judge’s home state and the applicant have a common religion, the judge is biased toward
the applicant at the 99 percent level; same, when the judge’s home state and the
respondent have a common religion (Table 4, regression (7)). But the latter result loses
significance when all the variables are included. We have a similar result for language.
When the two variables are tested jointly, they are significant at the 99 percent level for
applicants although not significant for respondents.
The results for regional matches and NATO matches are weak. In many
regressions, we do not get significant results, and in some regressions the signs are the
opposite of what was predicted. The problems here are lack of variation (as explained
before); high levels of multicollinearity;40 and, in a few cases, not enough observations.

38

Because we have a significant amount of missing data for GDP, we follow a technique suggested by
Cohen and Cohen (1983) where we code all missing GDP data with a 0. We then create a dichotomous
missing GDP variable where missing data is coded 0, and all other values are coded with a 1. The
justification for the technique is described in detail by David C. Howell at
< http://www.uvm.edu/~dhowell/StatPages/More_Stuff/Missing_Data/Missing.html>.
39
We also test democracy scores dichotomously at a democracy score of 6, and a democracy score of 7.
The results (unreported) further are consistent with our hypothesis: when democracy is tested at a score of 6
or higher, the respondent-judge democracy match achieves statistical significance at the 99% level of
confidence, while the applicant-judge democracy match is statistically insignificant; when controls are
introduced, the same variable achieves statistical significance at the 95% level of confidence for both
democracy matches. When democracy is tested at a score of 7 or higher, it yields the same overall result as
when tested at 6 in the base regression; when controls are introduced, the respondent-judge match is
significant at the 95% level of confidence, while the applicant-judge democracy match is statistically
insignificant.
40
When tested jointly, they are significant at the 95 percent level for applicants but not significant for
respondents.
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We think the safest conclusion is that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that judges are
not biased by NATO and regional matches.41
There are a number of other possible control variables that one might want to use.
(1) Cold War: perhaps judges were more biased during the Cold War when the world was
more polarized than it is today. (2) Jurisdiction: perhaps judges are less biased when the
parties appear voluntarily (special agreement) than when one party is a respondent. (3)
Type of case: perhaps certain types of cases like border disputes are less polarizing than
others (like use of force), and judges are less biased in the former types of cases. (4)
Judge country: perhaps judges from certain countries (for example, liberal democracies)
are less biased than judges from other countries. (5) Applicant and respondent countries:
perhaps some countries are more or less likely to be the subject of bias because they are
generally considered good (Sweden) or bad (Libya) world citizens.
We tested all these possibilities and will not burden the reader with our results.42
It is sufficient to say that our main results—for applicant and respondent match, for
democracy, for wealth, and (somewhat weaker) for language and religion—are robust.
The controls themselves do not appear to be important.43
What do these numbers mean? Are the biases we identify trivial or important?
As we have seen, a judge whose home state does not share a relevant
characteristic with either the applicant or respondent votes in favor of the applicant with a

41

Another possible measure of strategic alignment is trade: it is possible that a judge from a state with good
trading relations with a party would be more likely to vote for that party. We tried to test this hypothesis
using data on trade flows, but because the data are relatively recent (post-1962) and partial (excluding
many states), we don’t have much confidence in regressions. Simple correlations suggest a positive
relationship between a vote for the applicant and variables that measure the relative strength of the trading
relationship between the judge's state and the applicant. There is a positive relationship, for example,
between the probability of voting for the applicant and the sum of exports and imports between the judge’s
state and the applicant; a negative relationship between the probability of voting for the applicant and the
sum of exports and imports between the judge’s state and the respondent; and a positive relationship
between the probability of voting for the applicant and the ratio of exports and imports with applicant over
exports and imports with respondent (both weighted for judge’s state’s GDP and not). Most of these
relationships are significant at the 10 percent level but not all of them are.
42
Available from authors. We did not use case or judge fixed effects because of data limitations. We also
reran the regressions after dropping all cases involving interveners, multiple applicants, and multiple
respondents; doing this changes our results only trivially.
43
Except that the results are somewhat stronger for the Cold War. But there are not enough post-Cold War
cases for us to determine whether bias has significantly weakened since then. As Voeten (2000, 213) found
that post-Cold War voting in the General Assembly shows an East-West cleavage similar to that which
prevailed during the Cold War, we should be cautious about assuming that the ICJ voting would be
different.
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probability of around 0.5. Holding all of the other independent variables at their means,
the probability of a judge voting in favor of the applicant increases by 27 percentage
points when the judge and applicant are from the same country; when the judge’s country
matches the respondent’s country, the likelihood of his voting for the applicant decreases
by the about same amount. As the democracy variable increases from its minimum to its
maximum, the likelihood of a judge favoring the applicant increases by 25 percentage
points. As it increases one standard deviation around the median, the likelihood of
favoring the applicant increases by 7 percentage points. As the GDP per capita variable
increases from its minimum to its maximum, the probability that the judge favors the
applicant increases by 32 percentage points. As it increases one standard deviation
around the median, the likelihood increases by 5 percentage points. The probability of a
judge voting in favor of the applicant increases by 24 percentage points when the judge’s
home state’s language is the same as the applicant, compared to the case of no match. But
the probability is virtually unchanged when the language match is with the respondent.
The bottom line on the regressions is clear. Judges are biased in favor of their own
countries, and in favor of countries that match the economic, political, and (somewhat
more weakly) cultural attributes of their own. As for regional and military groupings—
whether economic or strategic—we are hampered by multicollinearity and lack of
variation.44
IV. Conclusion
The data suggest that national bias has an important influence on the
decisionmaking of the ICJ. Judges vote for their home states about 90 percent of the time.
When their home states are not involved, judges vote for states that are similar to their
home states—along the dimensions of wealth, culture, and political regime. Judges also
may favor the strategic partners of their home states, but here the evidence is weaker
because of multicollinearity; if they do, the magnitude of the bias is probably low.
We have not shown in a straightforward way that judges are consciously biased.
All that we have shown is that the judges, on the margin, don’t vote impartially in the
44

As an additional test of our results, we did an in-sample prediction on our probit regression that included
every variable. We found that our regression coefficients accurately predicted case outcomes 69 percent of
the time.
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manner prescribed by the null hypothesis. The motivation for their vote may be
psychological or cultural; the judges do not necessarily consciously choose to favor a
state that is strategically aligned with the judges’ own state.
The evidence also does not prove that the ICJ is dysfunctional, though it gives one
pause. For one thing, judges may vote dispassionately when the applicant and respondent
are both very similar to their own state; they may also vote dispassionately when the
applicant and respondent are both very different from their own state. In these cases,
there is no reason for the judges to be biased, although they may be outvoted by judges
who are biased. How often such cases arise is hard to say.
In addition, even biased judges may sometimes swallow their biases and vote in
an unbiased manner. Judges who vote 90 percent in favor of their home state vote 10
percent against their home state, and so in this small fraction of cases they may be voting
sincerely. It is also possible that they are voting strategically, of course—they may vote
against their own state on occasion in order to help maintain the appearance of
impartiality. But the possibility of sincere voting in some cases cannot be dismissed on
the basis of our data set.
Whether this level of bias matters depends on what the ICJ is supposed to
accomplish. According to one study, compliance with ICJ judgments hovers around the
60 percent level.45 It may be that states are aware that the ICJ judges are sometimes but
not always biased, and that the states are more likely to use the Court and comply with
judgments when they believe that the judgments are not biased. When a state’s own judge
votes against his home state, or when judges from a given bloc vote against a party from
that bloc, it may take the judgment more seriously than otherwise, and be more inclined
to comply with it. If so, the ICJ may play a useful role, albeit under narrow conditions
and for limited purposes.
The founders of the ICJ did anticipate the problem of judicial bias. Some people
thought that judges should not be allowed to hear cases involving their home states,
precisely because they feared that such judges could not decide the cases impartially; for
the same reason, the ad hoc system was anathema. Our evidence vindicates the premise

45

But for doubts, see Posner (2004).
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of these critics but not their remedy. For our evidence suggests that even nonparty judges
would be influenced by legally irrelevant factors.
The designers themselves appeared to think that party judges would ensure that
each state would get a fair hearing during deliberations. It is certainly possible that judges
could not be made to understand the claims of a state whose perspective they do not
share, unless one of their number was a national or representative of that state. Our
evidence does not reveal whether the cases were decided more impartially than they
would have been if party judges had been prohibited.
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Appendix: Variable Definitions and Sources
Our data set consists of all cases for which there was an opinion on a preliminary
objection, the merits, or a similarly substantive issue, from the beginning of the ICJ’s
operations in 1946, through March 1, 2004. For each case, we determine the vote of each
judge on each issue; whether the judge ultimately sided with one party or the other; and
whether the judge was a part of the majority, concurrence, or dissent. Records improve
over time; in a few earlier cases, we could not always answer these questions for a
particular judge in a particular case, in which case the observation was dropped.
Some cases involved multiple proceedings with separate votes (for example, on a
preliminary objection and then on the merits). In the reported regressions, we generally
used the latest proceeding unless it seemed minor (like an interpretive case); but we reran
our regressions using all the proceedings, and the results differ only trivially.
Table A1 contains our main variables with coding and sources.
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Table A1: Variable Coding and Sources
Variables
pwin
applicant
respondent
app-region
res-region
inter-region
app-nato
res-nato
inter-nato
app-language
res-language
inter-language
app-religion
res-religion
inter-religion
democracy

ln per capita
gdp
missing gdp
data

Coding and Sources
The dependent variable. Equal to 1 if the judge rules in favor of the applicant; equal to 0
if otherwise.
Equal to 1 if the applicant’s country and judge’s country match; equal to 0 if otherwise.
Equal to 1 if the respondent’s country and judge’s country match; equal to 0 if
otherwise.
Equal to 1 if the region of the applicant’s country and the judge’s country are the same.
Equal to 0 if otherwise. Regions are defined by individual continents.
Equal to 1 if the region of the respondent’s country and the judge’s country are the
same. Equal to 0 if otherwise. Regions are defined by individual continents.
App-region multiplied by res-region.
Equal to 1 if the respondent’s country and the judge’s country are both members of
NATO; equal to 0 if otherwise.
Equal to 1 if the respondent’s country and the judge’s country are both members of
NATO; equal to 0 if otherwise.
app-nato multiplied by res-nato
Equal to 1 if applicant and judge’s state have same majority language; equal to 0
otherwise.
Equal to 1 if respondent and judge’s state have same majority language; equal to 0
otherwise.
App-language multiplied by res-language
Equal to 1 if applicant and judge’s state have same majority religion; equal to 0
otherwise.
Equal to 1 if respondent and judge’s state have same majority religion; equal to 0
otherwise.
app-religion multiplied by res-religion.
Absolute value of the difference between the judge’s state’s democracy score and the
applicant’s democracy score minus the difference between the judge’s state’s
democracy score and the respondent’s democracy score. Democracy scores are from
Polity IV.
Absolute value of the difference between the judge’s state’s logged per capita GDP and
the applicant state’s logged per capita GDP minus the difference between the judge’s
state’s logged per capita GDP and the respondent’s logged per capita GDP. Equal to 0 is
data is missing. Data comes from the Penn World Tables. The figures are adjusted to a
1996 base year and adjust for purchasing power parity.
Equal to 1 if applicant, respondent, or judge country does not have missing GDP data.
Equal to 0 if the applicant, respondent, or judge country has missing GDP data.
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Table A2: Summary Statistics for Variables Used in Regression Analysis
Variable
pwin
applicant
respondent
app-region
resp-region
iregion
ln gdp per cap.
missing gdp data
democracy
app-nato
resp-nato
inato
app-language
resp-language
ilang
app-religion
resp-religion
ireligion

Observations
1437
1560
1560
1560
1560
1560
1560
1560
1160
1560
1560
1560
1560
1560
1560
1560
1560
1560

Mean
0.51
0.06
0.06
0.31
0.34
0.23
0.02
0.49
-0.89
0.11
0.19
0.07
0.13
0.15
0.04
0.26
0.27
0.12

Std. Dev.
0.50
0.23
0.23
0.46
0.47
0.42
0.56
0.50
5.35
0.31
0.39
0.26
0.33
0.36
0.19
0.44
0.44
0.33

*interaction terms are omitted
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Min
0
0
0
0
0
0
-2
0
-10
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Max
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
10
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

References
Alter, Karen J.. 1998. Who are the ‘Masters of the Treaty’?: European Governments and
the European Court of Justice. International Organization. 52: 121-147.
Beck, Nathaniel, Jonathan N. Katz, and Richard Tucker. 1998. Taking Time Seriously:
Time-Series-Cross Section Analysis with a Binary Dependent Variable. American
Journal of Political Science 42: 1260-1288.
Bergara, Mario, Barak D. Richman, and Pablo T. Spiller. 2003. Modeling Supreme Court
Strategic Decision Making: The Congressional Constraint. Legislative Studies Quarterly
28: 247-280.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair
Smith. 1999. An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace. American Political
Science Review 93: 791-807.
Chayes, Abram and Antonia Handler Chayes. 1995. The New Sovereignty: Compliance
With International Regulatory Agreements.
Cohen, J. and P. Cohen. 1983. Applied Multiple Regression/Correlation Analysis for the
Behavioral Sciences. 2nd ed. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum Press.
Epstein, Lee, and Jack Knight. 1997. The Choices Justices Make. Washington, DC:
Congressional Quarterly Press.
Feenstra, Robert C. 2002. U.S. Import Data.
http://data.econ.ucdavis.edu/international/index.html.
Franck, Thomas. 1995. Fairness in International Law and Institutions. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Gibson, James L. and Gregory A. Caldeira. 1995. “The Legitimacy of the Court of
Justice in the European Union: Models of Institutional Support.” American Political
Science Review 89: 356-376.
Ginsburg, Tom and Richard H. McAdams. 2004. Adjudicating in Anarchy: An
Expressive Theory of International Dispute Resolution. William & Mary Law Review 45:
1229-1339.
Greene, William. 1993. Econometric Analysis. 2nd ed. New York: Macmillan Publishing
Company.
Hausman, Jerry A. and David A. Wise. 1978. A Conditional Probit Model for Qualitative
Choice: Discrete Decisions Recognizing Interdependence and Heterogeneous
Preferences. Econometrica 46: 403-426

34

Hensley, Thomas R.. 1968. National Bias and the International Court of Justice. Midwest
Journal of Political Science 12: 568-586.
Heston, Alan, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten. 2002. Penn World Table Version 6.1.
Philadelphia: Center for International Comparisons, University of Pennsylvania.
Laisney, Francois and Michael Lechter. 2002. Almost Consistent Estimation of Panel
Probit Models with “Small” Fixed Effects. ZEW Discussion Paper 02-64.
Lake, David. 1992. Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War. American Political
Science Review 86: 24-37.
Lipson, Charles. 2003. Reliable Partners: How Democracies Have Made a Separate
Peace. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Marshall, Monty G. and Keith Jaggers. 2002. Polity IV Dataset. College Park, MD:
Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland.
McWhinney, Edward, Douglas Ross, Grigory Tunkin, Vladen Vereshchetin (eds.). 1991.
From Coexistence to Cooperation: International Law and Organization in the Post-Cold
War Era. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff.
Posner, Eric A. 2004. The Politics of the International Court of Justice. Unpublished m.s.
Reisman, Michael. 1995. Metamorphoses: Judge Shigeru Oda and the International
Court of Justice, The Canadian Yearbook of International Law 185.
Religion Statistics by Country. 2004. World Facts and Figures.
http://www.worldfactsandfigures.com/complete_list.php
Robertson, Raymond. 2004. International Language Data.
http://www.macalester.edu/research/economics/PAGE/HAVEMAN/Trade.Resources/Dat
a/Gravity/language.txt
Robinson, Davis R.. 2003. The Role of Politics in the Election and the Work of Judges of
the International Court of Justice. Proceedings of the American Society of International
Law.
Rosenne, Shabtai. 1995. The World Court: What It Is and How It Works. Boston:
Martinus Nijhoff.
Samore, William. 1956. National Origins v. Impartial Decisions: A Study of World Court
Holding. Chicago-Kent Law Review 34: 193-221.
Schweller, Randall. 1992. Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies
More Pacific? World Politics 44: 235-269.

35

Segal, Jeffrey A. and Harold J. Spaeth. 1993. The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal
Model. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Suh, Il Ro. 1969. Voting Behavior of National Judges in International Courts. American
Journal of International Law 63: 224-236.
Voeten, Erik. 2000. Clashes in the Assembly. International Organization 54: 185-215.
Weiss, Edith Brown. 1987. Judicial Independence and Impartiality: A Preliminary
Inquiry. pp. 123-154 in The International Court of Justice at a Crossroads, edited by
Lori F. Damrosch. Dobbs Ferry, NY: Transnational Publishers, Inc.
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. 2003. Econometric Analysis of Cross-Section and Panel Data.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Readers with comments should address them to:
Eric A. Posner
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
eposner@uchicago.edu

36

Chicago Working Papers in Law and Economics
(Second Series)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

William M. Landes, Copyright Protection of Letters, Diaries and Other Unpublished Works: An
Economic Approach (July 1991)
Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T. J. Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom in the Law of
Tort (August 1991)
Cass R. Sunstein, On Property and Constitutionalism (September 1991)
Richard A. Posner, Blackmail, Privacy, and Freedom of Contract (February 1992)
Randal C. Picker, Security Interests, Misbehavior, and Common Pools (February 1992)
Tomas J. Philipson & Richard A. Posner, Optimal Regulation of AIDS (April 1992)
Douglas G. Baird, Revisiting Auctions in Chapter 11 (April 1992)
William M. Landes, Sequential versus Unitary Trials: An Economic Analysis (July 1992)
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Influence of Economics on Law: A Quantitative Study
(August 1992)
Alan O. Sykes, The Welfare Economics of Immigration Law: A Theoretical Survey With An
Analysis of U.S. Policy (September 1992)
Douglas G. Baird, 1992 Katz Lecture: Reconstructing Contracts (November 1992)
Gary S. Becker, The Economic Way of Looking at Life (January 1993)
J. Mark Ramseyer, Credibly Committing to Efficiency Wages: Cotton Spinning Cartels in Imperial
Japan (March 1993)
Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law (April 1993)
Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everyone Else Does)
(April 1993)
Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Randal C. Picker, Bankruptcy Rules, Managerial Entrenchment, and
Firm-Specific Human Capital (August 1993)
J. Mark Ramseyer, Explicit Reasons for Implicit Contracts: The Legal Logic to the Japanese Main
Bank System (August 1993)
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Anticipatory Adjudication
(September 1993)
Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law (September 1993)
Alan O. Sykes, An Introduction to Regression Analysis (October 1993)
Richard A. Epstein, The Ubiquity of the Benefit Principle (March 1994)
Randal C. Picker, An Introduction to Game Theory and the Law (June 1994)
William M. Landes, Counterclaims: An Economic Analysis (June 1994)
J. Mark Ramseyer, The Market for Children: Evidence from Early Modern Japan (August 1994)
Robert H. Gertner and Geoffrey P. Miller, Settlement Escrows (August 1994)
Kenneth W. Dam, Some Economic Considerations in the Intellectual Property Protection of
Software (August 1994)
Cass R. Sunstein, Rules and Rulelessness, (October 1994)
David Friedman, More Justice for Less Money: A Step Beyond Cimino (December 1994)
Daniel Shaviro, Budget Deficits and the Intergenerational Distribution of Lifetime Consumption
(January 1995)
Douglas G. Baird, The Law and Economics of Contract Damages (February 1995)
Daniel Kessler, Thomas Meites, and Geoffrey P. Miller, Explaining Deviations from the Fifty
Percent Rule: A Multimodal Approach to the Selection of Cases for Litigation (March 1995)
Geoffrey P. Miller, Das Kapital: Solvency Regulation of the American Business Enterprise (April
1995)
Richard Craswell, Freedom of Contract (August 1995)
J. Mark Ramseyer, Public Choice (November 1995)
Kenneth W. Dam, Intellectual Property in an Age of Software and Biotechnology (November 1995)
Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles (January 1996)

37

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

J. Mark Ramseyer and Eric B. Rasmusen, Judicial Independence in Civil Law Regimes:
Econometrics from Japan (January 1996)
Richard A. Epstein, Transaction Costs and Property Rights: Or Do Good Fences Make Good
Neighbors? (March 1996)
Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit State (May 1996)
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Legal Disputes Over the Ownership
of Works of Art and Other Collectibles (July 1996)
John R. Lott, Jr. and David B. Mustard, Crime, Deterrence, and Right-to-Carry Concealed
Handguns (August 1996)
Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs (September 1996)
G. Baird, The Hidden Virtues of Chapter 11: An Overview of the Law and Economics of Financially
Distressed Firms (March 1997)
Richard A. Posner, Community, Wealth, and Equality (March 1997)
William M. Landes, The Art of Law and Economics: An Autobiographical Essay (March 1997)
Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law (April 1997)
John R. Lott, Jr. and Kermit Daniel, Term Limits and Electoral Competitiveness: Evidence from
California’s State Legislative Races (May 1997)
Randal C. Picker, Simple Games in a Complex World: A Generative Approach to the Adoption of
Norms (June 1997)
Richard A. Epstein, Contracts Small and Contracts Large: Contract Law through the Lens of
Laissez-Faire (August 1997)
Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, and David Schkade, Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes
on Cognition and Valuation in Law) (December 1997)
William M. Landes, Lawrence Lessig, and Michael E. Solimine, Judicial Influence: A Citation
Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges (January 1998)
John R. Lott, Jr., A Simple Explanation for Why Campaign Expenditures are Increasing: The
Government is Getting Bigger (February 1998)
Richard A. Posner, Values and Consequences: An Introduction to Economic Analysis of Law
(March 1998)
Denise DiPasquale and Edward L. Glaeser, Incentives and Social Capital: Are Homeowners Better
Citizens? (April 1998)
Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics (May 1998)
John R. Lott, Jr., Does a Helping Hand Put Others At Risk?: Affirmative Action, Police
Departments, and Crime (May 1998)
Cass R. Sunstein and Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Second-Order Decisions (June 1998)
Jonathan M. Karpoff and John R. Lott, Jr., Punitive Damages: Their Determinants, Effects on Firm
Value, and the Impact of Supreme Court and Congressional Attempts to Limit Awards (July 1998)
Kenneth W. Dam, Self-Help in the Digital Jungle (August 1998)
John R. Lott, Jr., How Dramatically Did Women’s Suffrage Change the Size and Scope of
Government? (September 1998)
Kevin A. Kordana and Eric A. Posner, A Positive Theory of Chapter 11 (October 1998)
David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law (November 1998)
Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law (November 1998)
John R. Lott, Jr., Public Schooling, Indoctrination, and Totalitarianism (December 1998)
Cass R. Sunstein, Private Broadcasters and the Public Interest: Notes Toward A “Third Way”
(January 1999)
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence (February 1999)
Yannis Bakos, Erik Brynjolfsson, Douglas Lichtman, Shared Information Goods (February 1999)
Kenneth W. Dam, Intellectual Property and the Academic Enterprise (February 1999)
Gertrud M. Fremling and Richard A. Posner, Status Signaling and the Law, with Particular
Application to Sexual Harassment (March 1999)
Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically? (March 1999)

38

71.

82.

Jonathan M. Karpoff, John R. Lott, Jr., and Graeme Rankine, Environmental Violations, Legal
Penalties, and Reputation Costs (March 1999)
Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis (April 1999)
John R. Lott, Jr. and William M. Landes, Multiple Victim Public Shooting, Bombings, and Right-toCarry Concealed Handgun Laws: Contrasting Private and Public Law Enforcement (April 1999)
Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy: A
Preliminary Study (May 1999)
Richard A. Epstein, Deconstructing Privacy: and Putting It Back Together Again (May 1999)
William M. Landes, Winning the Art Lottery: The Economic Returns to the Ganz Collection (May
1999)
Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, and Daniel Kahneman, Do People Want Optimal Deterrence?
(June 1999)
Tomas J. Philipson and Richard A. Posner, The Long-Run Growth in Obesity as a Function of
Technological Change (June 1999)
David A. Weisbach, Ironing Out the Flat Tax (August 1999)
Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law under Conditions of Radical Judicial Error (August 1999)
David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein, and Daniel Kahneman, Are Juries Less Erratic than Individuals?
Deliberation, Polarization, and Punitive Damages (September 1999)
Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons (September 1999)

83.

Richard A. Posner, The Theory and Practice of Citations Analysis, with Special Reference to Law

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

and Economics (September 1999)
84.

Randal C. Picker, Regulating Network Industries: A Look at Intel (October 1999)

85.

Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis (October 1999)

86.

Douglas G. Baird and Edward R. Morrison, Optimal Timing and Legal Decisionmaking: The Case

87.

Gertrud M. Fremling and Richard A. Posner, Market Signaling of Personal Characteristics

of the Liquidation Decision in Bankruptcy (October 1999)
(November 1999)
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences Are
Distorted (November 1999)
Richard A. Posner, Orwell versus Huxley: Economics, Technology, Privacy, and Satire (November
1999)
David A. Weisbach, Should the Tax Law Require Current Accrual of Interest on Derivative
Financial Instruments? (December 1999)
Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Group Polarization (December 1999)
Eric A. Posner, Agency Models in Law and Economics (January 2000)
Karen Eggleston, Eric A. Posner, and Richard Zeckhauser, Simplicity and Complexity in Contracts
(January 2000)
Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, Boyd’s Legacy and Blackstone’s Ghost (February 2000)
David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, Deliberating about Dollars: The Severity Shift
(February 2000)
Richard A. Posner and Eric B. Rasmusen, Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special Reference to
Sanctions (March 2000)
Douglas Lichtman, Property Rights in Emerging Platform Technologies (April 2000)
Cass R. Sunstein and Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Solidarity in Consumption (May 2000)
David A. Weisbach, An Economic Analysis of Anti-Tax Avoidance Laws (May 2000, revised May
2002)
Cass R. Sunstein, Human Behavior and the Law of Work (June 2000)
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Harmless Error (June 2000)
Robert H. Frank and Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative Position (August 2000)
Eric A. Posner, Law and the Emotions (September 2000)
Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles (October 2000)

39

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Jack Goldsmith and Alan Sykes, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Internet (November
2000)
Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy (November 2000)
Douglas Lichtman, Scott Baker, and Kate Kraus, Strategic Disclosure in the Patent System
(November 2000)
Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International Relations: A
Rational Choice Perspective (November 2000)
William Meadow and Cass R. Sunstein, Statistics, Not Experts (December 2000)
Saul Levmore, Conjunction and Aggregation (December 2000)
Saul Levmore, Puzzling Stock Options and Compensation Norms (December 2000)
Richard A. Epstein and Alan O. Sykes, The Assault on Managed Care: Vicarious Liability, Class
Actions and the Patient’s Bill of Rights (December 2000)
William M. Landes, Copyright, Borrowed Images and Appropriation Art: An Economic Approach
(December 2000)
Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule (January 2001)
George G. Triantis, Financial Contract Design in the World of Venture Capital (January 2001)
Jack Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption (February 2001)
Richard Hynes and Eric A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Consumer Finance (February 2001)
Cass R. Sunstein, Academic Fads and Fashions (with Special Reference to Law) (March 2001)
Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive Political Theory
Perspective (April 2001)
Douglas G. Baird, Does Bogart Still Get Scale? Rights of Publicity in the Digital Age (April 2001)
Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, Control Rights, Priority Rights and the Conceptual
Foundations of Corporate Reorganization (April 2001)
David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths about Tax Shelters (May 2001)
William M. Landes, What Has the Visual Arts Rights Act of 1990 Accomplished? (May 2001)
Cass R. Sunstein, Social and Economic Rights? Lessons from South Africa (May 2001)
Christopher Avery, Christine Jolls, Richard A. Posner, and Alvin E. Roth, The Market for Federal
Judicial Law Clerks (June 2001)
Douglas G. Baird and Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making (June 2001)
Cass R. Sunstein, Regulating Risks after ATA (June 2001)
Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear (June 2001)
Richard A. Epstein, In and Out of Public Solution: The Hidden Perils of Property Transfer (July
2001)
Randal C. Picker, Pursuing a Remedy in Microsoft: The Declining Need for Centralized
Coordination in a Networked World (July 2001)
Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade, and Ilana Ritov, Predictably Incoherent
Judgments (July 2001)
Eric A. Posner, Courts Should Not Enforce Government Contracts (August 2001)
Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation through
Rules, Norms, and Institutions (August 2001)
Richard A. Epstein, The Allocation of the Commons: Parking and Stopping on the Commons
(August 2001)
Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic (September 2001)
Eric A. Posner, Richard Hynes, and Anup Malani, The Political Economy of Property Exemption
Laws (September 2001)
Eric A. Posner and George G. Triantis, Covenants Not to Compete from an Incomplete Contracts
Perspective (September 2001)
Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law (November 2001)
Randall S. Kroszner and Philip E. Strahan, Throwing Good Money after Bad? Board Connections
and Conflicts in Bank Lending (December 2001)
Alan O. Sykes, TRIPs, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha “Solution” (February
2002)

40

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Edna Ullmann-Margalit and Cass R. Sunstein, Inequality and Indignation (February 2002)
Daniel N. Shaviro and David A. Weisbach, The Fifth Circuit Gets It Wrong in Compaq v.
Commissioner (February 2002) (Published in Tax Notes, January 28, 2002)
Warren F. Schwartz and Alan O. Sykes, The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute
Resolution in the WTO/GATT System (March 2002, Journal of Legal Studies 2002)
Richard A. Epstein, HIPAA on Privacy: Its Unintended and Intended Consequences (March 2002,
forthcoming Cato Journal, summer 2002)
David A. Weisbach, Thinking Outside the Little Boxes (March 2002, Texas Law Review)
Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law after Three Decades: Success or Failure (March
2002)
Randal C. Picker, Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution (April 2002, The
Antitrust Bulletin)
David A. Weisbach, Taxes and Torts in the Redistribution of Income (April 2002, Coase Lecture
February 2002)
Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle (April 2002)
Robert W. Hahn and Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving Federal Regulation?
Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis (April 2002)
Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence (May 2002, updated January 2003)
Richard A. Epstein, Steady the Course: Property Rights in Genetic Material (May 2002; revised
March 2003)
Jack Goldsmith and Cass R. Sunstein, Military Tribunals and Legal Culture: What a Difference
Sixty Years Makes (June 2002)
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright (July 2002)
Anne Gron and Alan O. Sykes, Terrorism and Insurance Markets: A Role for the Government as
Insurer? (July 2002)
Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions (July 2002)
Cass R. Sunstein, The Rights of Animals: A Very Short Primer (August 2002)
Cass R. Sunstein, Avoiding Absurdity? A New Canon in Regulatory Law (with Notes on
Interpretive Theory) (August 2002)
Randal C. Picker, From Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the
Propertization of Copyright (September 2002)
Eric A. Posner, A Theory of the Laws of War (September 2002)
Eric A. Posner, Probability Errors: Some Positive and Normative Implications for Tort and Contract
Law (September 2002)
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of Cooperation on the
File-Swapping Networks (September 2002)
David A. Weisbach, Does the X-Tax Mark the Spot? (September 2002)
Cass R. Sunstein, Conformity and Dissent (September 2002)
Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics (October 2002)
Douglas Lichtman, Uncertainty and the Standard for Preliminary Relief (October 2002)
Edward T. Swaine, Rational Custom (November 2002)
Julie Roin, Truth in Government: Beyond the Tax Expenditure Budget (November 2002)
Avraham D. Tabbach, Criminal Behavior: Sanctions and Income Taxation: An Economic Analysis
(November 2002)
Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of “Old” Public Health: The Legal Framework for the Regulation of
Public Health (December 2002)
Richard A. Epstein, Animals as Objects, or Subjects, of Rights (December 2002)
David A. Weisbach, Taxation and Risk-Taking with Multiple Tax Rates (December 2002)
Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy (December 2002)
Richard A. Epstein, Into the Frying Pan: Standing and Privity under the Telecommunications Act of
1996 and Beyond (December 2002)
Douglas G. Baird, In Coase’s Footsteps (January 2003)

41

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

David A. Weisbach, Measurement and Tax Depreciation Policy: The Case of Short-Term Assets
(January 2003)
Randal C. Picker, Understanding Statutory Bundles: Does the Sherman Act Come with the 1996
Telecommunications Act? (January 2003)
Douglas Lichtman and Randal C. Picker, Entry Policy in Local Telecommunications: Iowa Utilities
and Verizon (January 2003)
William Landes and Douglas Lichtman, Indirect Liability for Copyright Infringement: An
Economic Perspective (February 2003)
Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics (March 2003)
Amitai Aviram, Regulation by Networks (March 2003)
Richard A. Epstein, Class Actions: Aggregation, Amplification and Distortion (April 2003)
Richard A. Epstein, The “Necessary” History of Property and Liberty (April 2003)
Eric A. Posner, Transfer Regulations and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (April 2003)
Cass R. Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalizm Is Not an Oxymoron (May 2003)
Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of WTO Rules on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (May
2003)
Alan O. Sykes, The Safeguards Mess: A Critique of WTO Jurisprudence (May 2003)
Alan O. Sykes, International Trade and Human Rights: An Economic Perspective (May 2003)
Saul Levmore and Kyle Logue, Insuring against Terrorism—and Crime (June 2003)
Richard A. Epstein, Trade Secrets as Private Property: Their Constitutional Protection (June 2003)
Cass R. Sunstein, Lives, Life-Years, and Willingness to Pay (June 2003)
Amitai Aviram, The Paradox of Spontaneous Formation of Private Legal Systems (July 2003)
Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat, Decreasing Liability Contracts (July 2003)
David A. Weisbach and Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs (September
2003)
William L. Meadow, Anthony Bell, and Cass R. Sunstein, Statistics, Not Memories: What Was the
Standard of Care for Administering Antenatal Steroids to Women in Preterm Labor between 1985
and 2000? (September 2003)
Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and Marriage
(September 2003)
Randal C. Picker, The Digital Video Recorder: Unbundling Advertising and Content (September
2003)
Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, and Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideological Voting on Federal Courts
of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation (September 2003)
Avraham D. Tabbach, The Effects of Taxation on Income Producing Crimes with Variable Leisure
Time (October 2003)
Douglas Lichtman, Rethinking Prosecution History Estoppel (October 2003)
Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight (October 2003)
David A. Weisbach, Corporate Tax Avoidance (January 2004)
David A. Weisbach, The (Non)Taxation of Risk (January 2004)
Richard A. Epstein, Liberty versus Property? Cracks in the Foundations of Copyright Law (April
2004)
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy (January 2004)
Eric A. Posner and John C. Yoo, A Theory of International Adjudication (February 2004)
Cass R. Sunstein, Are Poor People Worth Less Than Rich People? Disaggregating the Value of
Statistical Lives (February 2004)
Richard A. Epstein, Disparities and Discrimination in Health Care Coverage; A Critique of the
Institute of Medicine Study (March 2004)
Richard A. Epstein and Bruce N. Kuhlik, Navigating the Anticommons for Pharmaceutical Patents:
Steady the Course on Hatch-Waxman (March 2004)
Richard A. Esptein, The Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules (April 2004)
Eric A. Posner and Alan O. Sykes, Optimal War and Jus Ad Bellum (April 2004)
Alan O. Sykes, The Persistent Puzzles of Safeguards: Lessons from the Steel Dispute (May 2004)

42

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Luis Garicano and Thomas N. Hubbard, Specialization, Firms, and Markets: The Division of Labor
within and between Law Firms (April 2004)
Luis Garicano and Thomas N. Hubbard, Hierarchies, Specialization, and the Utilization of
Knowledge: Theory and Evidence from the Legal Services Industry (April 2004)
James C. Spindler, Conflict or Credibility: Analyst Conflicts of Interest and the Market for
Underwriting Business (July 2004)
Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Public International Law (July 2004)
Douglas Lichtman and Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable (July 2004)
Shlomo Benartzi, Richard H. Thaler, Stephen P. Utkus, and Cass R. Sunstein, Company Stock,
Market Rationality, and Legal Reform (July 2004)
Cass R. Sunstein, Group Judgments: Deliberation, Statistical Means, and Information Markets
(August 2004, revised October 2004)
Cass R. Sunstein, Precautions against What? The Availability Heuristic and Cross-Cultural Risk
Perceptions (August 2004)
M. Todd Henderson and James C. Spindler, Corporate Herroin: A Defense of Perks (August 2004)
Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death (August 2004)
Randal C. Picker, Cyber Security: Of Heterogenity and Autarky (August 2004)
Randal C. Picker, Unbundling Scope-of-Permission Goods: When Should We Invest in Reducing
Entry Barriers? (September 2004)
Christine Jolls and Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing through Law (September 2004)
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of the Use of Citations in the Law (2000)
Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Environment (October 2004)
Kenneth W. Dam, Cordell Hull, the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act, and the WTO (October 2004)
Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation (November 2004)
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy (December 2004)
Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War (December 2004)
Douglas Lichtman, How the Law Responds to Self-Help (December 2004)
Eric A. Posner, The Decline of the International Court of Justice (December 2004)
Eric A. Posner, Is the International Court of Justice Biased? (December 2004)

43

